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PREFACE 
My big aims in writing this book have been: 
(1) to integrate into a single volume the economic, historical, legal, politi-
cal science, and sociological assessments and methods used on both sides of 
the Atlantic to analyze the major aspects of German industrial relations; and 
(2) to make innovative arguments using new evidence regarding the trajec-
tory of German industrial relations. 
Academics often wax eloquently in the abstract about the superiority of 
interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity, but in practice most stay in their 
individual disciplinary lanes and focus their scholarship narrowly. Indeed, it 
is rare to find any study of industrial relations anywhere that discusses both 
trade unions and employers in a single book, no less one that uses multiple 
methods drawn from the different tribes of academe. In this book, in con-
trast, I do take an interdisciplinary approach. I use the tools of a range of 
disciplines to address the questions that each discipline commonly asks. I 
then integrate these assessments to gain a broader and deeper understanding 
of German industrial relations than could be obtained through individual 
studies undertaken by scholars in each discipline acting in isolation. 
The uneven chapter lengths are the most immediate manifestation of the 
book's interdisciplinary approach. This is most apparent when comparing 
chapters 3 and 4. I intentionally wrote chapter 3 the way economists write. 
Consequently, it is relatively short. Chapter 4 takes a historical approach. As 
a result, it is considerably longer. The other chapters, which incorporate a 
range of disciplines, fall somewhere in between. I should also note that the 
first two chapters are in part intended for people new to the topic of German 
industrial relations. Those more familiar with the topic are likely to be most 
interested in chapters 3 to 5 and the conclusion, because these feature more 
novel arguments and original evidence. 
Finally, it is worth noting why I chose Holding the Shop Together as the 
title for this book. First, it captures what many of the actors themselves say 
they are doing. During the hundreds of interviews that I have done over the 
years with officials at German employers associations and trade unions, many 
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interview partners summed up their efforts by saying that they were simply 
trying "to hold the shop together" (den Laden zusammenhalten) in the face 
of increasingly difficult circumstances. Second, Holding the Shop Together in 
Enghsh (but not in German) contains two words with double meaning that 
deepen the title's import. First, the word Laden, which is commonly trans-
lated as "shop," simply means store in German. In Enghsh, however, shop 
can also mean workshop, the traditional focal point of industrial relations. 
Second, the word "together" can be understood in two ways. One meaning 
is not letting things fall apart. A second meaning places the emphasis on labor 
and management working together rather than as adversaries. These double 
meanings turn the title into a nice summary statement of a signature aspect 
of postwar German industrial relations: the embrace of a mutually accepting 
"social partnership" by both collective bargaining parties. It also captures the 
ongoing effort of both labor and management to hold together their organi-
zations and the industrial relations system in the postwar era. 
I have been working on the topic of German industrial relations for three 
decades. Finishing a book on the topic gives me the opportunity to thank 
many people, some of whom should have been thanked long ago. I would 
first like to thank my parents Pauline and William Silvia for their extraor-
dinary love and support over the years. They made my career possible, for 
which I am forever grateful. I would also like to thank their friends Ekkehard 
and Sybille Feustel. On many occasions, they showed me what Gemiltlichkeit 
really means. John Windmuller was an extremely helpful and influential 
mentor while I was an undergraduate at Cornell University and beyond. 
Although he is no longer with us, he certainly deserves acknowledgment. 
Many German researchers and practitioners have helped me over the years, 
especially, Wolf-RiidigerBaumann,Hansj6rg Dopp, Wolfgang Goos,Berthold 
Huber, Otto Jacobi, Thomas Klebe, Hartmut Kiichle, Wolfgang Lecher, Karl 
Molitor, Walther Muller-Jentsch, Klaus Murmann, Hinrich Oetjen, Matthias 
von Randow, Helmut Schauer, Klaus Schnabel, Hubertus Schmoldt, Fried-
rich Wilhelm Siebel, Michael Sommer, Wolfgang Streeck, Karsten Tacke, 
Norbert Trautwein, Gudrun Trautwein-Kalms, Manfred Warda, Wolfgang 
Weipert, Detlev Wetzel, Jorg Wiedemuth, and Michael Vassiliadis. In particu-
lar, I would like to acknowledge the important support that I have received 
from Reiner Hoffmann and Nik Simon, and thank my great friend, Wolf-
gang Schroeder, who has provided me with considerable insight into German 
industrial relations and who was kind enough to read some draft chapters 
of the book. I would also like to recognize Mike Fichter and David Soskice 
for all of their help, which was considerable, as well as recently retired social 
affairs counselor at the US Embassy in Berlin, Joachim Kowalik. 
k 
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Returning to this side of the Atlantic, the social counselors at the Ger-
man embassy have all been extremely helpful over the years in providing 
me with both information and opportunity to meet with the top figures in 
German industrial and labor relations when they have passed through Wash-
ington and keeping me up on what was going on in Germany: Karl Felden-
gut, Markus Franz, Giinther Horzetzky, Michael Mersmann, and Karl Pitz. 
I would particularly like to thank Marion Knappe for her helpful comments 
on a draft chapter. Andrew Martin and George Ross, two greats in the field 
of comparative labor relations, have always been extremely supportive, for 
which I am extremely grateful. Conversations with Adam Posen of the 
Peterson Institute were very helpful for framing things in the context of the 
larger German economy, as were numerous exchanges with individuals in 
the private sector, in particular, Robert Dugger, Thornton Mattheson, Amy 
Houpt Medearis, Robert McNally, and Angel Ubide. I would like to thank 
Dieter Dettke and Jack Janes for all of their substantial support over the 
years. Special thanks go to Andrei Markovits for his extraordinarily insight-
ful comments on the penultimate draft of this book. I very much appreciate 
the help I received from my research assistants Heidi Hiebert, Rob Kevlihan, 
and Mike Stanaitis, as well as the encouragement and support that I received 
from Louis Goodman. 
It has been a great pleasure working with Cornell University Press ILR 
editorial director Fran Benson and acquisitions assistant Kitty Liu. I have very 
much appreciated their very helpful advice and guidance. 
I am grateful to the numerous funders that supported the research 
that went into this book. These include the American Institute for Con-
temporary German Studies, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the German Fulbright Commission, the 
Hans Bockler Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Hu-
manities. I would like to acknowledge the support of my children Chris-
topher, Sean, and Peter, who properly kept me engaged in the daily life of 
coaching and practices while I was working on the book and supported 
me daily through their love and encouragement. Above all I am forever 
grateful to my wife, Jennifer Paxton. Jenny lived through every twist and 
turn of this book. She gave me sound advice, considerable time, and an 
extraordinary degree of support. I could not have completed it if it were 
not for her. 
' Finally, I would like to let readers know that the bibliography for this 
book as well as the quantitative data and supplemental tables from the anal-
ysis in chapter 3 can be found at http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/ 
Silvia-Holding-the-Shop-Together.cfm. 
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Introduction 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 
late 2008 there has been a boom in positive assessments of the German 
economy.1 Little wonder. Remarkably, Germany has managed to bring down 
unemployment to more than one percentage point below the precrisis level 
and to maintain a current account surplus equivalent to 5 percent of its gross 
domestic product. This is not the first time that Germany's stock has rid-
den high. German economic institutions received praise for the "economic 
miracle" of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the "model Germany" economy 
that weathered the oil shocks comparatively well during the 1970s, and the 
"export world champion" economy of the mid-1980s. At other times, how-
ever, academics and journalists have been bearish on Germany. High unem-
ployment dogged the German economy for a quarter century, starting in the 
early 1980s. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, Germany was generally 
dismissed as the economic "sick man" of Europe. These oscillating appraisals 
of the German economy raise two questions: Does the current positive as-
sessment of German economic institutions reflect something real, or is it just 
another speculative bubble? And, what is it about German economic institu-
tions that has drawn the attention of so many over the years? In this book 
I address these questions by examining a key pillar of the postwar German 
economy, namely, the industrial relations system. 
2 HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER 
The industrial relations system holds a prominent place in the German 
economy. It is strongest where the German economy is strongest. It is re-
sponsible for many of the distinctive features of postwar German capital-
ism. Industrial relations institutions extend into the boardrooms, workplaces, 
and government to a degree that is unimaginable in most other countries. 
Collective bargaining determines compensation for a substantial majority 
of German employees. Trends in German industrial relations, moreover, are 
reliably indicative of developments in the broader German economy and fre-
quently influence industrial relations developments beyond Germany's bor-
ders. All these aspects make the German industrial relations regime an ideal 
focal point for developing a deeper understanding of the German economy 
as a whole and its international impact. 
The story of postwar German industrial relations is fascinating and re-
flective of many broader economic, political, and social trends in postwar 
Germany. Immediately after the Nazi era, employers, workers, and legisla-
tors struggled—sometimes as partners and at other times as adversaries— 
to rebuild a viable industrial relations regime. The cautionary legacy of 
the demise of German democracy in the 1930s helped to keep the effort 
focused and constructive. Engagement led to change. Employers sup-
ported democracy without reservations for the first time and accepted the 
unions as equal partners. Trade unionists reached a modus vivendi with 
capitalism and in the 1960s explicitly embraced white-collar employees. 
These efforts paid off. From the 1950s through the 1970s, the postwar 
German industrial relations system flourished and served as an important 
component of an effective economy and a sound democracy. German 
trade unions and employers associations embraced "social partnership," 
that is, acceptance of each other as equal partners that work together 
constructively to advance the economic and social well-being of German 
citizens. 
The idyllic conjuncture did not last, however. The industrial relations 
system began to come under stress in the 1980s. The German domestic 
economy started to falter, and a shift toward individualism in German 
society, which began in the 1960s, produced a more challenging set of 
countercurrents for organized business and labor. Many employers asso-
ciations and trade unions began to experience difficulties recruiting and 
retaining members. When German unification became a sudden reality, 
economic and social heterogeneity expanded greatly, amplifying the chal-
lenge collective bargaining parties faced to produce collective agreements 
that were viable and acceptable to all. The legal framework supporting 
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German industrial relations remained sound, but collective bargaining 
coverage shrank because of membership losses in some (but not all) em-
ployers associations. 
Thus, the 1990s and 2000s were decades of experimentation born out 
of desperation for organized labor and management alike. The unions 
engaged in a spate of mergers that starkly concentrated the movement in 
order to shore up its structural integrity. By the turn of the millennium, just 
two unions accounted for over two-thirds of all German union member-
ship. Both collective bargaining parties experimented with new forms of 
recruiting and retaining members. Some reforms were bold. Others were 
incomplete and contradictory. Internecine disagreements and rivalries com-
plicated matters. Large unions continued to lose members. Small occupa-
tional unions have increasingly challenged the large ones. The accumulation 
of daunting challenges has led some to wonder how long organized labor and 
management will remain influential. 
The story is not all negative, however. Labor and management in the 
chemicals industry have forged an intensive social partnership manifested 
in scores of supplemental agreements that cover a wide range of topics well 
beyond collective bargaining. In the late 2000s, the metalworkers union 
embraced grassroots "social movement unionism," which has its origins 
in the United States, and began a radical reorganization. This effort has 
been the first to show promise in reversing membership declines. Employ-
ers associations and trade unions have managed to hold on to their leading 
roles in the German economy and society. They showed that they could 
still work together in society when they acted effectively to minimize the 
impact of the global financial crisis. This productive cooperation brought 
them renewed respect. 
Design and Principal Findings of This Book 
Five chapters form the core of this book. They can be divided into two 
parts. The first part presents in two chapters the framework of the German 
industrial relations system, that is, the laws and the role of the state. The first 
chapter discusses German labor law and several state institutions that are cru-
cial components of the industrial relations regime. The second chapter in-
vestigates Germany's distinctive system of codetermination. The second part, 
which consists of three chapters, analyzes the principal actors in German 
industrial relations: the trade unions and the employers associations. The 
conclusion combines the material portrayed in chapters 1 through 5 into a 
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comprehensive picture and then considers the future of German industrial 
relations. 
In chapter 1, I challenge conventional wisdom in two respects. First, I 
call into question the assertion that defeat in the Second World War laid 
the groundwork for Germany's postwar economic "miracle" by clearing 
out the laws and interest-group bargains that were alleged to have previ-
ously constrained economic growth.2 This is decidedly not the case when 
it comes to German economic statutes, especially industrial relations legis-
lation. Postwar German labor law is in most respects a refurbished version 
of the laws of the Weimar Republic and, in some instances, the Second 
Empire. To the extent that the laws are different, they contain provisions 
that have strengthened the scope and coverage of the industrial relations 
regime. The German government enacted these laws by the early 1950s. 
Thus, a full thicket of laws was already in place before the famous German 
"economic miracle" took off starting in the mid-1950s, and those laws did 
not impede growth. 
The second shibboleth concerns the importance of the German state 
in industrial relations. Industrial relations practitioners and politicians rou-
tinely declare collective bargaining to be autonomous of the state. Yet, a 
detailed examination of German labor law in chapter 1 makes plain the 
indispensible role of the state in buttressing the postwar German industrial 
relations regime. Laws, regulations, agencies, and courts unobtrusively sus-
tain a framework highly supportive of "autonomous" collective bargaining. 
Ironically, union officials and employers are generally oblivious to the state's 
important role. German-style regulation relies on maintaining background 
"framework conditions" (Rahmenbedingungen) conducive to the state's objec-
tives rather than remedial intervention. Unlike in most other high-income 
countries, the German framework has remained intact, despite consider-
able buffeting, particularly since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Germany's 
consensual form of federal democracy, which usually requires the assent of 
the major established parties and a large share of the states to make major 
legislative changes, helps account for the stability of postwar industrial rela-
tions over the years.3 
Chapter 2 appraises the uniquely German system of codetermina-
tion, which gives employees some say in management decision making. 
Codetermination has two components: works councils, which are repre-
sentative bodies of employees in the workplace, and employee represen-
tation on supervisory boards. Codetermination has made trade unions 
especially resilient because it anchors employee participation in the law 
and provides an added platform for employee influence in a company's 
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affairs besides collective bargaining. Employers' attitudes toward code-
termination have always been ambivalent. Most praise it in public and 
genuinely welcome the opportunity codetermination provides for build-
ing a cooperative relationship with employees in the workplace, but some 
also charge that German codetermination laws are costly and infringe on 
property rights. Employers have always been especially critical of various 
forms of parity representation on supervisory boards as a violation of 
management rights. 
Officials from employers associations and trade unions have repeatedly 
tried to amend codetermination legislation over the years, with occasional 
success. Most recently, labor spearheaded the passage of a law strengthen-
ing workplace codetermination in the early 2000s. In contrast, employers 
undertook a concerted effort to roll back employee representation on super-
visory boards in the mid-2000s, but failed. The results of both efforts illus-
trate the continuing strong support for codetermination in German politics 
and society and the enduring resilience of these components of the statutory 
framework of German industrial relations. 
The future of codetermination is not completely secure, however. The 
biggest threats come not from within Germany but from the European 
Union. The first is European legislation. Over the years, successive Ger-
man governments, regardless of political complexion, have ensured that EU 
commercial laws intended to deepen the internal market do not undermine 
domestic codetermination. The need to make sure that new European legis-
lation promoting economic integration does not undercut codetermination 
is no less pressing today. The second threat to codetermination has come 
from the European Court of Justice. Since the mid-2000s, the ECJ has 
pursued an aggressive agenda of economic liberalization that has begun to 
chafe against Germany's codetermination statutes. The incompatibility is 
likely to intensify in coming years. It is premature, however, to determine 
the ultimate outcome. 
The first part of the book shows that the framework of the postwar 
German industrial relations system has remained intact and performed 
effectively. The principal actors—that is, the trade unions and the employers 
associations4—have not fared nearly as well, however. Most have lost a large 
portion of their memberships over the past two decades. The second part of 
the book explores why. 
Chapter 3 opens the consideration of membership developments by 
undertaking a quantitative analysis of the unionization rate in postwar 
Germany. The book's model of union density overturns accepted expla-
nations by introducing new variables. Previous models of unionization 
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in Germany focused exclusively on economic and demographic vari-
ables. Chapter 3 includes two additional factors: "social custom" and 
trade. The notion that social custom—that is, the social expectations and 
the milieu that influence an individual's decision to join a union—has an 
impact on unionization has been discussed broadly in the general litera-
ture on union density, but it has never been incorporated into a quantita-
tive model of German unionization. Holding the Shop Together employs an 
innovative measure of social custom and finds it to be the most powerful 
factor correlated with the German unionization rate, establishing empir-
ically the importance of this sociological element in German unionization. 
The quantitative analysis also reveals trade as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product correlates positively with the German unionization rate, 
which runs counter to much of the qualitative literature on the sources 
of trade union decline but is consistent with Germany's strong record as 
an exporter.5 German unification also correlates positively with union-
ization, confounding conventional expectations. The results in chapter 3 
are consistent with those of the first two chapters. The decline in Ger-
man trade union density is not the result of a breakdown of labor law 
or state institutions but rather the deterioration of trade unionism as a 
social custom. 
Chapter 4 undertakes a broader qualitative assessment of the German 
trade union movement. It builds on the findings of the previous chapter 
by probing the strategic considerations and actions of trade union lead-
ers in light of postwar sociological and economic trends. The record of 
the postwar German trade unions is one of remarkable stability and suc-
cess in their first four decades. Stability did not last, however. From the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s, plummeting membership figures in both 
eastern and western Germany triggered a reorganization of the unions 
of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB, German Trade Union Fed-
eration) and the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (DAG, German 
White-Collar Employees Union) through a spate of mergers that was so 
substantial that it is best understood as the creation of a second postwar 
German trade union movement. The first was an industrial union move-
ment structured by the principle that each major sector should have one 
(and only one) trade union. The second is a multisectoral union move-
ment that is dominated by two mammoth organizations that span mul-
tiple sectors: Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall, Industrial Union of 
Metalworkers) and Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di, United 
Service Employees Union). 
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The second postwar trade union movement achieved fuller economies of 
'' scale, resulting in greater organizational stability, but most have not managed 
to staunch membership decline. The mergers that created the multisectoral 
movement may have inadvertently precipitated another phenomenon that 
has proved problematic for larger unions. Small occupational unions, par-
ticularly in the transportation sector, have become more prominent players 
in German industrial relations. Some have used their choke point posi-
tions in the economy to extract sizable wage concessions. The success of 
occupational unions since the latter half of the 2000s has embarrassed the 
leadership of the multisectoral unions because the large unions have not been 
able to secure comparable wage gains. The heads of the large unions also fear 
that the spectacular successes of the occupational unions may stoke demands 
to break up the multisectoral unions only a few years after they had gone to 
great pains to create them. 
The 2000s were a particularly difficult decade for the German labor 
k
 movement. A weak economy led to meager results at the bargaining table 
and declining real incomes. Experiments with peak-level neocorporatism in 
the form of the Alliance for Jobs failed to produce reforms or any tangible 
improvements in the labor market. German chancellor Gerhard Schroder 
responded to the failure of the neocorporatist Alliance for Jobs in his first 
term of office by largely dispensing with consultation in his second term 
and enacting legislation designed to liberalize the German labor market. 
The two largest unions—IG Metall and ver.di—tried confrontation to stave 
off the labor market reforms but failed. The aggressive tactics generated 
much rancor within the labor movement, especially between the leaders 
of the two giant unions and the chair of the third biggest German union, 
the Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE, Industrial 
Union of Mining, Chemical, and Energy Employees), who preferred a more 
conciliatory approach. By mid-decade, IG Metall and ver.di abandoned 
political confrontation after it had proved ineffectual. It took a leadership 
change in the federal chancellery and in IG Metall for the labor movement 
„ to recover some semblance of its past standing. 
' The years since the 2008 global financial crisis have not been all bad 
for German trade unions. Ironically, formulating effective policies to ad-
dress the crisis and subsequent downturn brought trade unions, employers 
associations, and the government together, restoring some of the collective 
bargaining partners' influence. At the end of the decade, the largest unions 
also attempted to reverse their fortunes by pursuing internal reforms. The 
, strategies were diverse. IG BCE doubled down on the pursuit of intensive 
'' *» 
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social partnership. In contrast, IG Metall began efforts to shore up social 
customs supportive of union membership by borrowing the rhetoric and 
techniques of social movement unionism from English-speaking coun-
tries.6 The metalworkers union also adopted several measures designed to 
strengthen the incentives and resources to recruit and to retain members, 
particularly at the local level. IG Metall's grassroots strategy has yielded 
some initial success. In 2012, union membership grew in all categories, 
including the all-important currently employed and youth subsegments, 
for the first time in decades. It is still too soon to tell whether a social 
union movement strategy pioneered in the decentralized and adversarial 
environment of US plant-level union-recognition elections can succeed 
over the long haul in an industrial relations system steeped in an ethos of 
cooperation and with a center of gravity for collective bargaining at the 
sectoral level. Nonetheless, IG Metall's reform effort is a demonstration 
of the creativity and resolve still present in the German labor movement. 
A few local ver.di officials experimented with social movement unionism 
as well, but the union's fragmented and frozen structure prevented local 
lessons from percolating upward. 
Chapter 5 turns to the other side of the collective bargaining table. It 
starts with a brief discussion of the prewar establishment and postwar re-
construction of employers associations. It is employers associations'substan-
tially higher density and more complete coverage of the economy rather 
than a high unionization rate that have given postwar German collective 
bargaining such broad reach in determining compensation. As a result, den-
sity trends among employers associations have been of greatest importance 
in determining the influence of the postwar system of German industrial 
relations. 
Officials of employers associations tightened their influence over mem-
ber firms during the 1960s by strengthening the capacity of associations to 
engage in industrial actions and by using lockouts frequently. Despite these 
steps, which curtailed the autonomy of individual firms, the associations 
maintained high membership densities. In the 1980s, external economic 
developments—namely, Europeanization, globalization, and the introduction 
of new manufacturing techniques such as "lean production"—challenged 
employers associations. Large original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
faced much stiffer competition from companies both at home and abroad. 
They in turn placed pressure on their suppliers by cutting prices and de-
manding higher quality. The impact of the transmission of this intensified 
economic pressure from the global to the national level varied depending 
on the sector. For sectors in which both the OEMs and their suppliers are 
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in the same employers association (e. g., mechanical engineering), the trans-
mission of economic pressure prompted a disproportionately high share of 
small supplier firms to "flee" their associations, which lowered employ-
ers association density. In contrast, high and stable membership in employers 
associations has prevailed in sectors dominated by large firms with suppliers 
mostly in other sectors (e. g., chemicals). The empirical findings from the 
chapter also disconfirm the claim of Schmitter and Streeck that employers 
associations must choose between maximizing external influence and retain-
ing membership.7 The chemical industry employers associations increased 
influence over the member firms but retained members. The employers as-
sociation in the mechanical engineering sector, in contrast, sacrificed influ-
ence and catered heavily to members, but association density in that sector 
declined nonetheless. 
In the conclusion I discuss the implications of the five substantive 
chapters and compare the findings to other countries. Most striking are 
the divergent trajectories of the principal components of the German 
industrial relations system. Germany's consensual politics have effectively 
protected the legal framework. Trade union membership is declining 
due in large part to domestic sociological developments. The bifurcation 
of membership trends among employers associations is the product of 
international economic integration playing out differently in individual 
sectors, depending on their structures. The legal framework has provided 
sufficient support to prevent membership decline from turning into a 
commensurate loss of influence. The neocorporatist components of the 
German state, such as the Federal Employment Agency, have helped to 
preserve the political influence of trade unions and employer associa-
tions. Codeterminat ion has also served as a backbone for German in-
dustrial relations and in particular the trade unions, because it provides 
for employees' access, voice, and resources in firms that are guaranteed 
by statute rather than just union muscle. Codeterminat ion has also in-
tertwined labor and management to such an extent that it is far harder 
for employers to escape organized industrial relations in Germany than 
m most other countries. Still, the divergent trajectories raise questions 
about how much longer the postwar industrial relations system can hold 
together. 
The social partners are not giving up, however. Both have devoted an 
L unprecedented amount of attention and resources to membership recruit-
^ ment and retention. The largest union is experimenting with US-style 
L social movement unionism. Many employers associations are trying new 
L types of membership, including ones that do not require participation 
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in collective bargaining. It is too soon to tell whether these experiments 
will reverse membership declines or whether these efforts to save the 
industrial relations system will wind up destroying it. The surge in ex-
perimentation and ongoing uncertainty are among the developments that 
make contemporary German industrial relations both interesting and im-
portant. 
Most previous work on German industrial relations has focused on 
the parts of the German industrial relations system rather than the whole. 
Many scholars have written about the trade unions.8 Others have surveyed 
the labor market, law, or employers associations.9 This fragmentation of 
the scholarship is unfortunate because it has become increasingly clear 
that the various parts of German industrial relations can only be prop-
erly understood in context. Only a few authors have produced books on 
German industrial relations, but those books either predate German uni-
fication or consist of descriptive summaries designed primarily for teach-
ing. 10 So, there is room for a comprehensive scholarly treatment of German 
industrial relations such as this one. 
In this book I use multiple methods—specifically, historical institution-
alism and statistical analysis—both to evaluate several existing theoretical 
assertions and to sketch some new causal mechanisms. I do not rely on 
an overarching theory of industrial relations, capitalism, or interest groups 
(German or otherwise), but at several junctures I do assess the two most 
prominent explanations for developments in German industrial relations: 
"erosion" and "exhaustion." 
The erosion and exhaustion arguments share an assertion that there has 
been a general weakening of all of the components of the German industrial 
relations system over the last twenty to thirty years. Advocates of the erosion 
argument claim that German industrial relations functioned well from the 
immediate postwar years into the mid-1970s because the German economy 
was relatively sheltered. Thereafter, a series of developments exogenous to 
industrial relations—the end of full employment, rising private service-sector 
employment, German unification, and "European integration and globaliza-
tion since the mid-1980s"—all contributed to the "erosion" of the German 
industrial relations regime.11 
Wolfgang Streeck claims in his 2009 Re-Forming Capitalism that German 
industrial relations have become "disorganized." At one point or another in 
the book, Streeck loosely invokes a wide variety of explanations and mecha-
nisms for this development. These include liberalization, the dialectic, Karl 
Polanyi's double movement, and a surge in the rapaciousness of German 
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employers. The heart of Streeck's argument, however, comes in part 2, where 
he focuses on "exhaustion." Streeck references Darwin and asserts that "the 
mere passage of time" brings down institutions because their efficacy inevi-
tably declines and maintenance costs rise simply because economic and social 
change make institutions fit less well in their environment. " Positive exter-
nalities turn negative" as a result, and institutions ultimately break down. In 
chapter 10, Streeck asserts that "time's up" for the institutions of the postwar 
German economy and, in particular, industrial relations. They are now at the 
point of exhaustion.12 
The summary of my findings makes clear that I do not think the evidence 
supports either the "erosion" or "exhaustion" argument. Both obscure more 
than they reveal because they become black boxes that hinder investigation 
into the diverse trajectories and causal mechanisms behind membership 
change in employers associations and unions. 
Why German Industrial Relations Matters 
Knowledge of the German industrial relations system is essential to compre-
hending fully many topics beyond its immediate scope. As mentioned at the 
outset, the German economy cannot be understood without a firm grasp of 
the industrial relations system. Consequently, any economic analysis of the 
German economy that does not reflect a solid understanding of German 
industrial relations is bound to miss the mark. The German economy mat-
ters, in turn, because Germany is a powerhouse exporter and a key player in 
world capital markets. The German economy has been repeatedly held up 
as a model for others to emulate.13 The euro crisis, which began in 2009, is 
just the latest demonstration of the pivotal place of the German economy in 
both Europe and the world. All indications are that in the future Germany 
will become even more dominant in the European economy and remain 
important in the world economy. 
Beyond economics, German trade unions and employers associations 
are powerful actors in German and European society. They are among 
the most affluent and innovative labor and management organizations 
in the world. Their influence extends far beyond Germany's borders. 
Unraveling the puzzle of why many employers associations and unions 
began to shrink after decades of growth and stability addresses a dilemma 
confronting many organizations in all affluent democracies.14 Moreover, 
several prominent academic theories, such as collective action,15 neocor-
poratism,16 and varieties of capitalism,17 use German industrial relations 
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either as a prominent part of a critical case or as a thinly veiled sketch 
model for ideal types, such as "the Rhine model" and the "coordinated 
market economy." Thus, having a strong understanding of German in-
dustrial relations is essential to a wide variety of analyses, both economic 
and political. 
CHAPTER 1 
The Enduring Resilience of the Law and 
the State in German Industrial Relations 
In this chapter I examine the role of law and 
the state in German industrial relations. This is to familiarize readers with the 
distinctive history and contemporary features of German labor law because 
they profoundly shape the reckoning of German employees and employ-
ers about what are possible and preferable policies in the field of industrial 
relations. I also make clear that law and the German state have been crucial 
in supporting and sustaining the postwar industrial relations regime. 
I challenge two commonly held perceptions about labor law and the role 
of the state in Germany. First, some scholars have asserted that the German 
economy was more successful in the immediate postwar era because los-
ing the Second World War wiped the slate clean of prewar laws and deals 
between interest groups and the state that hindered growth.1 An examina-
tion of the facts, however, demonstrates that postwar German law and prac-
tice in most areas consist largely of borrowings from the Weimar Republic 
and even the Second Empire. They have been, if anything, more numerous 
and encompassing than in previous eras. This is certainly true for postwar 
industrial relations. Second, labor and management practitioners typically 
stress collective bargaining autonomy and underplay the important role 
the state plays in providing the prerequisites for that autonomy. Rather, the 
German state has served as a sturdy trestle supporting the postwar indus-
trial relations regime. Contrary to the erosion and exhaustion arguments 
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discussed in the introduction, the foundations of the law and the state have 
remained as robust components of German industrial relations. 
I am also clearing the field here for one of my larger arguments, namely, 
that the forces driving membership trends for German trade unions and em-
ployers associations differ. Unionization is primarily a sociological phenom-
enon, whereas employers association membership is principally an economic 
calculation based on sectoral considerations. State support of German 
industrial relations is quite important, but it has been a constant; it therefore 
cannot be held responsible for change in the postwar era. 
German Labor Law: A Brief Overview 
Germans commonly refer to the start of postwar reconstruction in May 
1945 as "hour zero," largely because of the devastating impact of the war 
and the wholesale scrapping of Nazi state structures. A brief review of the 
contents and antecedents of statutes delineating freedom of association, col-
lective bargaining, and adjudication of workplace disputes reveals, however, 
that most of the components of the postwar regime are refurbished versions 
of prewar institutions, practices, and structures. I begin with a discussion of 
the freedom of association, which is the bedrock on which both the statutes 
and the jurisprudence for industrial relations is built. In subsequent sections, 
I examine the legal provisions undergirding collective bargaining, contracts, 
labor courts, and the regulation of industrial disputes. 
Freedom of Association 
In industrial relations, freedom of association (Koalitionsfreiheit) means the 
right of employees to organize trade unions and of managers to form 
employers associations. This right existed formally even in Imperial Ger-
many, though it was often difficult for employees to exercise it in practice. 
Most business associations and individual firms in Imperial Germany went 
to considerable lengths to avoid having to deal with unions. Employers fre-
quently used ties to local police and politicians to harass unionists and to 
disrupt their organizations. At times the German national government also 
made life difficult for unionists. Under the leadership of Imperial Chancel-
lor Prince Otto von Bismarck, the German state banned all socialist activi-
ties and organizations, including socialist trade unions, from 1878 to 1890.2 
Even after the expiration of the antisocialist laws, government officials at all 
levels in Imperial Germany frequently subjected unionists to spying, harass-
ment, dismissal, police violence, and sensational trials before biased judges. 
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The famous statement of Judge Lujo Brentano summarizes the contradic-
tory attitude of the Imperial German state toward trade unions: "Workers 
possess the freedom of association. If they make use of it, however, they will 
be punished."3 In contrast, the German state did not inhibit the creation and 
operation of business associations during this same period. In fact, it even 
permitted the formation of cartels. 
The First World War substantially changed the configuration of Ger-
k
 many's sociopolitical relations, which helped to advance the legitimization 
of trade unions. Once war broke out, nationalism trumped cross-national 
class solidarity for most workers and their organizations, despite consid-
erable rhetoric to the contrary in socialist circles in the years leading up 
to the conflict. German labor backed the war effort and quickly offered 
to participate in a "national unity front" to maintain a "civil peace" 
(Burgfrieden) for the duration of the conflict.4 Labor's initial contribu-
tion to the civil peace was a no-strike pledge. In return, employers and 
the government agreed to stop harassing trade unions and to cooperate 
with them throughout the war. The highpoint of the civil peace came on 
5 December 1916. The imperial government's Third Supreme Military 
Command headed by Gen. Paul von Hindenburg and Gen. Erich Luden-
dorff enacted the Auxiliary Patriotic Service Act (Gesetz betreffend den 
vaterlandischen Hilfsdienst). This act recognized unions as legal bargain-
ing agents for workers, opened the public sector to union recruitment, 
and required the establishment of employee committees in medium- and 
large-sized workplaces. In return, labor accepted a work requirement for 
all able-bodied males between seventeen and sixty and a stipulation that 
employees gain permission from their current employer before changing 
jobs. Labor leaders hoped that the civil peace would permanently anchor 
trade unions within Germany's economy and society, but achieving this 
r objective proved elusive.5 
Germany's defeat in the First World War unleashed considerable turbu-
lence. The kaiser abdicated on 9 November 1918, two days before Ger-
many signed the armistice to end hostilities. On November 10, a mass 
gathering of Berlin workers' and soldiers' councils elected a five-person 
council of "people's commissars" as the new government. All of the com-
missars were social democrats. Three were from the larger and more mod-
erate Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, SPD), and two were from the left-wing Independent So-
cial Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, USPD). Friedrich Ebert, head of the SPD, became 
provisional chancellor.6 
-L^fcU, 
16 HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER 
The kaiser's abdication did not induce union leaders to change their 
integrationist course, but it did trigger a renegotiation of labor's arrange-
ment with German employers. The unrest of the moment and the social 
democratic monopoly in the new provisional government put labor in the 
stronger strategic position. The upsurge of radicalism prompted signifi-
cant numbers of German employers to abandon their rejectionist attitude 
toward organized labor and to embrace the reformist trade unions as a 
way to save capitalism. Many established union leaders feared a full-blown 
socialist revolution nearly as much as did employers, because it would most 
likely sweep them and their organizations away along with the institutions 
of capitalism. Thus, a common interest in preserving the status quo served 
as a foundation for cooperation and compromise between German labor 
and management.7 
On 15 November 1918, business and union leaders acted on their own 
to start to build a post-Imperial industrial relations system. A delegation of 
social democratic trade unionists led by the head of the Generalkommis-
sion der Gerwerkschaften Deutschlands (General Commission of German 
Trade Unions), Carl Legien, and a group of prominent businesspeople led 
by Ruhr industrialist Hugo Stinnes signed a twelve-point pact known as 
the Stinnes-Legien agreement. The agreement took the form of a private 
contract rather than legislation because of doubts about the stability and 
legitimacy of the provisional German government. Most prominently, the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement recognized independent trade unions as the sole 
legitimate collective representative of employees, declared collective agree-
ments to be inviolate, permitted the formation of works councils (Betriebsrdte) 
in workplaces with more than fifty employees and instituted the eight-hour 
workday as a standard.8 
Germany's new republican constitution, drafted in the city of Weimar in ' 
1919, greatly improved the legal anchoring of labor's freedom of association. 
Article 159 of the Weimar constitution adopted much of the language of 
the Stinnes-Legien agreement, including the guarantee of the right of em-
ployees to form unions. Employers also remained free to create associations. >;. 
The German state generally respected this freedom of association during 
the Weimar era, although it did not always defend trade unions and their 
members from hostile employer actions (e.g., the use of strikebreakers and 
dismissal of union activists). 
Freedom of association soon came to an end after Adolf Hitler rose to 
power in January 1933. His National Socialist government did permit trade 
unionists to hold their traditional May Day celebration in 1933, but the 
f 
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motivation was by no means benign. The Nazis used the demonstrations 
to identify union activists. On the following day, autonomous union 
representation came to an abrupt end. Nazi officials conducted a massive 
nationwide sweep, arresting thousands of trade unionists and shutting down 
all independent labor organizations. In the place of unions, the Nazis set up 
the subservient Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF, German Labor Front).9 Nazis 
were far less confrontational with business associations, but they dissolved 
them nonetheless in 1934, replacing them with the Reichsgruppe Industrie, 
which had compulsory membership and a subservient relationship with the 
Nazi state. 
,A<. After the Second World War, Western occupying powers gradually re-
^ stored freedom of association, but it was ultimately up to Germans them-
selves to decide how such freedom should be structured in a postwar 
republic. From the summer of 1948 to the spring of 1949, a constitutional 
convention consisting of representatives elected by the parliaments of the 
western German states (Lander) met to draft a provisional constitution, 
which they called the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Article 9, section 3 of the 
Basic Law does not use the word "union" (Gewerkschqft), but it explicitly 
declares: "The right to form associations to safeguard and improve work-
ing and economic conditions shall be guaranteed to everyone and to all 
occupations." This expansive language, which includes all public-sector 
employees as well as white-collar employees with supervisory duties, ex-
ceeds the rights granted in many other countries (e.g., the United States). 
It should be noted that the general language of article 9, section 3 also 
gives firms full freedom to form employers associations. The only restric-
tion in the realm of industrial relations is a ban on company-dominated 
unions. Courts have ruled that company unions deny employees a genuine 
^ right to freedom of association.10 
Mindful of the compulsory nature of most Nazi organizations, court 
rulings have also interpreted article 9, section 3 of the Basic Law to pro-
tect the freedom not to be forced to belong to an organization, which in 
German legal parlance is called "negative freedom of association" (negative 
Koalitionsfreiheit). The doctrine of negative freedom of association forbids 
compulsory union membership (i.e., a "closed shop" or a "union shop") as 
^ a condition of employment, which is permissible in many English-speaking 
i countries. Since the 1960s, court rulings have forbidden collective bargain-
^ mg agreements that give some benefits to union members only, conclud-
^ mg that these amount to indirect pressure on employees to join a union. 
y This interpretation of article 9, section 3 has deprived unions of a means 
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to neutralize a significant free-rider problem that has deprived them of 
members and dues.11 Still, the Basic Law contains the strongest language 
protecting the rights of both employees and employers to organize ever 
found in any German constitution. 
Collective Bargaining and Contracts 
Whereas freedom of association simply guarantees the right of unions 
and employers associations to exist, a collective bargaining regime goes 
one step further. It establishes the ground rules for negotiations between 
employers and trade unions, and—in instances when talks fail—industrial 
conflict. German jurisprudence has built out the concept of "collective 
bargaining autonomy" (Tarifautonomie) as a predicate of the freedom of 
association. Collective bargaining autonomy at its foundation should not 
be equated with the absence of state involvement. The state does provide 
substantial support for collective bargaining "without, however, involving 
itself in the substantive issues dealt with around the bargaining table."12 
To draw an analogy, the role of the German state in industrial relations 
is like that of a fish bowl. The state's role in defining and sustaining the 
contours of a highly constructed realm of industrial relations is crucial, but 
it is in the background and often not immediately apparent to actors and 
observers alike. If it were withdrawn, however, the state's full significance 
would become immediately apparent to all, just as fish would immediately 
notice the disappearance of their bowl. The state's supporting role in in-
dustrial relations is consistent with postwar Germany's general approach to 
regulation, which has been to create underlying "framework conditions" 
(Rahmenbedingungen) that tilt the playing field for economic decision mak-
ing in a constructive direction, but then let private parties interact without 
interference.13 
The German state did not always provide supportive framework con-
ditions for collective bargaining. Before the First World War, collective 
bargaining was a precarious endeavor. Although Imperial Germany had 
a series of laws regulating working conditions, it had no industrial rela-
tions legislation. Collective agreements fell uneasily into the category of 
private contracts concluded by collective actors. Since cartels were legal 
in the Second Empire, there was no foundation in law to attack collec-
tive bargaining agreements as a restraint of trade, which was a common 
antiunion tactic in English-speaking countries at the time. Instead, ju-
dicial opinions varied widely. Some judges found collective bargaining 
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agreements to be illegal, but others did not. A few judges even ruled 
that collective agreements were binding on all employees, including non-
union members.14 
The 1916 Auxiliary Patriotic Service Act ended the legal ambiguity sur-
rounding collective bargaining agreements by definitively establishing their 
legitimacy, but it was only in the immediate post-Imperial years that the Ger-
man state adopted specific legal ground rules for collective bargaining. The 
Collective Agreements Order (Tarifvertragsordnung, TVO) of 23 December 
1918 laid the procedural foundation for collective bargaining in interwar 
Germany. The TVO had an unusual pedigree. Large portions of the order 
(which is quite short) came directly out of the Stinnes-Legien agreement 
that labor and management had crafted on their own six weeks earlier. The 
short-lived provisional German assembly passed it. The German govern-
ment, working under the Weimar constitution, absorbed the TVO into Ger-
man law. The new collective bargaining regime shifted most negotiations 
out of the workplace and into the hands of employers associations and the 
trade unions negotiating regionally for individual sectors, which helped to 
professionalize them and to reduce workplace-level conflict. It quickly took 
root and proved successful when it was used, but external circumstances 
reduced its application.15 
The great inflation of 1923 compelled the German government to in-
troduce a system of binding state arbitration as an option for settling labor 
disputes. This option gave the labor ministry the power to set compensa-
tion unilaterally, so long as the collective bargaining parties had agreed to 
submit themselves to it after negotiations had reached an impasse. During 
the mid-1920s, unions frequently resorted to state arbitration, taking ad-
vantage of a sympathetic labor ministry to achieve better contract results 
than could have been attained without intervention. Autonomous collective 
bargaining atrophied as a result. In 1928, poor economic conditions led the 
labor ministry to begin imposing settlements far less favorable to employees. 
In subsequent years, when economic conditions went from bad to worse 
as a result of the Great Depression, state arbitration awards became even 
more meager. The unions still used the arbitration regime, albeit reluctantly, 
because soaring unemployment undercut their capacity to wage successful 
strikes. In 1931, Chancellor Heinrich Briinning scrapped state arbitration. 
•L he horrendous unemployment of the time completely undercut union bar-
gaining power, and real wages plummeted. When the Nazis came to power 
m 1933, they eliminated collective bargaining altogether when they wiped 
°ut autonomous trade unions.16 
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After the war, it took several years to reassemble a collective bargain-
ing regime. The legislative components were once again put into place 
by a provisional government. On 9 April 1949, the assembly of the three 
united economic zones of western Germany passed the Tarifvertragsgesetz 
(TVG, Collective Agreements Act). The postwar German government 
subsequently adopted it as federal law. Just as in many other instances 
during the postwar reconstruction of Germany, the lawmakers decided 
to adhere very closely to the old law when drafting the new one. As a 
result, the structure, language, and even the name of the 1949 Collective 
Agreements Act echo the 1918 Collective Agreements Order. One por-
tion of the Weimar collective bargaining regime was pointedly dropped, 
however. The Allies banned binding state arbitration under article 2, sec-
tion 1 of Control Council Law 35 because of the bad experience with 
the practice during the Weimar Republic. The new Federal Republic of 
Germany followed suit.17 
The Collective Agreements Act is short. It has only 1,600 words in 
the original German. Article 1 defines a collective agreement as a written 
contract that regulates the rights and duties of the collective bargaining 
parties concerning the "content, conclusion and termination of em-
ployment relations." Article 2 states that collective agreements are legally 
binding and only employers associations, individual employers, and trade 
unions are eligible to make collective agreements (tariffahig). Germans 
call a contract between a union and an employers association that covers 
all member firms of the association a "regionwide" collective bargain-
ing agreement {Fldchentarifvertrag). A regionwide agreement has been the 
most common contractual arrangement in German industrial relations. A 
regionwide agreement is binding on all employers association and union 
members in the sector and district specified in the contract. There is 
nothing like a regionwide collective bargaining agreement in English-
speaking countries. The closest thing is pattern bargaining. Both pattern 
bargaining and regionwide bargaining have the same objective—that is, 
the elimination of competition on the basis of wage costs among firms in 
the same sector—but pattern bargaining is organized around firms rather 
than regions. 
The typical sector has a set of regionwide districts for the purposes of 
collective bargaining. The number of districts varies from sector to sector, 
depending on the specific profile of that sector (e.g., the size of firms 
and regional concentrations of production facilities). Most sectors have 
between eight and twelve districts. For each sector, formal negotiations 
to produce a new set of regionwide agreements take place separately in 
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the individual regional districts. In practice, however, the union leadership 
typically picks one district to serve as the "pilot." The lead negotiations 
take place in the pilot district, and, if talks break down, strikes normally 
occur there too. Union officials are strategic in selecting the district where 
a strike can be most effective economically and where the rank and file 
are motivated and capable. 
. Both the union and the employers associations in individual sectors gen-
erally prefer that all the other districts copy the results reached in the pilot 
district with little or no change, in order to avoid one region gaining a cost 
advantage over the others. The union and the confederation of employ-
ers associations for each sector have mechanisms designed to facilitate the 
spread of the pilot agreement to the other districts. The procedure for rati-
fying a regional contract within most unions typically includes approval by 
the union's national collective bargaining committee as a step, which makes 
rogue ratification of a regional contact impossible. The means of achieving 
nationwide uniformity on the employers' side of the table differ in several 
respects from those of the unions, reflecting crucial dissimilarities between 
employers associations and trade unions. 
Employers associations are not mass organizations, their members are 
firms rather than individuals, and their membership typically numbers 
only in the hundreds or low thousands for each district within a sector. As 
a result, employers associations rely far more heavily than unions on direct 
and informal means, such as e-mail and telephone calls, to gain a sense 
of membership preferences. Reaching consensus has frequently proved to 
be much harder for employers. The greater difficulty is not surprising. 
Employers association membership is far more heterogeneous than that 
of trade unions. Member firms range from small shops to multinational 
enterprises. Some members are bitter rivals; others are linked along sup-
ply chains or engaged in joint ventures. In practice, the leadership of the 
national confederation for each sector takes a principal role in setting and 
executing the strategy for each collective bargaining round, but it does so 
only after extensive consultations with key members, both large and small. 
Since the 1990s, the national bodies of employers associations in many 
sectors have strengthened coordination by assembling a national collec-
tive bargaining advisory group with representatives from leading regional 
associations in the sector and requiring the national sectoral organization 
to be on hand during negotiations in pilot districts. The purpose of these 
groups is to improve communication and buy-in and to decrease the 
likelihood that member firms will balk at a compromise reached at the 
bargaining table.18 
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It should be noted that, in some sectors, the union and the national 
confederation of employers associations have tolerated differences in re-
gional agreements. In most instances, the differences have been too small 
to produce significant regional divergences in labor costs. There are two 
prominent exceptions, however. First, in 1973, IG Metall's regional dis-
trict in Baden-Wiirttemberg agreed to a pilot framework agreement with 
the North Wiirttemberg—North Baden mechanical engineering employers 
association that tightly regulated assembly line work and gave employees 
expansive break times.19 No other regional employers association adopted 
this pilot framework agreement, which put Baden-Wiirttemberg employ-
ers at a cost disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors elsewhere in Germany 
until this agreement was replaced with a new one in the mid-2000s. Sec-
ond, since German unification, the compensation agreements for eastern 
Germany in most sectors have set rates lower than those for the western 
regions. 
TVG article 3 stipulates that all members of unions and employers 
associations remain bound by any regionwide collective agreement reached 
when they were members for the duration of those contracts even if they 
subsequently quit the organization. Firms cannot immediately escape the 
requirements of a collective agreement simply by leaving an association. 
This provision enhances the power of collective agreements and augments 
the stability of the organizations that sign them, in particular, employers 
associations. 
Uniformity in collective agreements does not extend beyond the sectoral 
level. Labor market conditions differ too greatly from sector to sector, and 
the institutional architecture of German industrial relations is too fragmented 
along sectoral lines to facilitate the coordination of collective bargaining 
across the whole economy. Still, collective bargaining results in some sectors 
do affect outcomes in others. Each year the settlement achieved by one of 
the stronger unions (usually the metalworkers) sets the unofficial benchmark 
for all of the others. 
The most common alternative to a regionwide collective agreement used 
in German industrial relations today is a single-firm contract (Firmentar-
ifvertrag), which is often called a "house" agreement. The number of single-
firm agreements has grown over the last thirty years, but they are still of 
secondary importance. In 2007, they only set compensation for 8 percent 
of all employees in western Germany and 13 percent in eastern Germany. 
Most house agreements only deviate from regionwide collective agreements 
at the margins.20 
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Whereas labor and management in most countries rely on a single con-
tract to cover all aspects of their relationship, multiple specialized contracts 
are the norm in Germany. The social partners use three specialized accords: 
the compensation collective bargaining agreement (Entgelttarifvertrag, ETV, 
often just referred to as a Tarijvertmg or collective bargaining agreement); the 
framework collective bargaining agreement (Rahmentarifvertrag, RTV); and 
the skeleton collective bargaining agreement (Manteltarifvertmg, MTV). 
r: The ETV is the most prominent of the three types of contracts. It sets 
pay and benefit rates. The media, central bankers, investors worldwide, 
public officials, and rank-and-file members of both trade unions and em-
ployers associations pay most attention to ETVs because they have the 
most immediate effect on pay and hence labor costs. ETVs are negotiated 
more frequently than any other type of contract. The duration of a typical 
ETV is one year, though variance from this norm is not unusual. Longer 
ETVs are most often the product of a more comprehensive agreement 
to phase in a new benefit (e.g., weekly working-time reduction), hard 
times, or the desire to provide more certainty for employers regarding 
future labor costs. Sometimes union negotiators ask for a thirteen- or 
fourteen-month contract so that the total wage increase over the life of 
the agreement is bigger than it would be for a twelve-month accord. This 
enables union officials to present a percentage increase to their members 
that is nominally closer to the initial union demand than a twelve-month 
agreement would allow. ETVs very rarely extend to three years in length, 
which is the typical duration of a US collective agreement. At times, when 
economic conditions have been especially unpredictable, the bargaining 
parties have agreed to ETVs as short as eight or nine months, but this is 
^ also quite rare.21 
The second type of German contract, the framework agreement, defines 
the job classifications and compensation structure within individual sectors. 
Jobs are defined by the tasks involved, educational requirements, and ex-
perience. Often, the classifications can be quite general, so that the thou-
sands of firms using the same classification scheme can easily adapt them to 
their specific needs. RTVs are extremely technical and notoriously complex. 
They are nonetheless quite important because they establish the underly-
ing framework for how work gets done and how one is paid for doing it. 
They also estabHsh the relative importance of education, work duties, and 
f experience in determining compensation. 
j * * In most instances, decades pass before the. collective bargaining parties 
renegotiate framework agreements. The long intervals between negotiations 
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are problematic because as framework agreements age, the occupational 
specifications they contain grow increasingly out of date. Old agreements 
have contained occupations that no longer exist (e.g., computer-card key 
punchers) and failed to provide guidance regarding the duties and pay for 
whole new classes of employees (e.g., webmasters) and work practices (e.g., 
group and home work). When the gap between an RTV and actual practice 
becomes too great, labor and management find that they can no longer put 
off a more comprehensive revision of the RTV. The collective bargaining 
parties wrote their first RTVs in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Most 
sectors in Germany drafted completely new RTVs during the 1960s. The 
microprocessing revolution of the 1980s prompted the production of a third 
generation of RTVs approximately a decade later. 
Historically, private-sector RTVs had five to eight blue-collar wage 
groups, within which pay was pegged to either piece rates or hourly work, 
and three to five white-collar salary groups. Starting in the 1990s, indi-
vidual sectors have increasingly adopted a single set of job classifications 
that cover all their employees, be they blue- or white-collar workers. The 
transition has occurred because automation has made blue- and white-
collar work less distinct, class difference has become less salient in post-
war German society, and simpler job classification schemes provide more 
flexibility and are cheaper and easier to manage. Contemporary RTVs 
typically have five to eight job categories for all employees based on tasks, 
technical knowledge, and experience. They provide for pay in the form of 
a monthly salary for all, but employees still receive a premium for doing 
overtime and extra work. 
An analogous transformation occurred in the public sector. The pub-
lic sector used the Federal Collective Agreement for Public Employees 
(Bundes-Angestellten-Tarif, BAT) as a framework agreement from 1961 to 
the mid-2000s. The BAT was a relic from a bygone era of paternalism and 
bureaucratic complexity. The BAT had over 16,000 attributes to determine 
compensation. The most important were age, seniority, and family size. Job 
performance was not an attribute. The result was a complex and arbitrary pay 
determination that did not reward the best performers. 
After years of talks, negotiators completed a new framework agree-
ment called the Tarifvertrag fur den offentlichen Dienst (TV6D, Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement for the Public Service Sector) in 2005. 
The TV6D is a significant departure from the BAT. It eliminates the 
old demographic categories for wage determination, sets a new lower 
baseline category (to enable the public sector to bring down costs to 
the level of private-sector firms providing similar services), and makes 
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erforniance central to pay, which is a revolution in the German public 
service sector. The bargaining parties were both satisfied with the TV6D, 
but the agreement has not been popular with some of the union rank and 
file particularly those who no longer receive the supplemental payments 
specified in the old contract. 
The third type of contract, the MTV or skeleton collective agreement, 
regulates the remaining terms and conditions of employment not covered 
by an ETV or RTV. MTVs include such things as weekly working time, 
overtime, maternity leave, sick pay, bonuses, vacation benefits, and severance 
provisions. Most MTVs consist of a main body followed by a series of in-
dependent contracts addressing particular items (e.g., vacation time and pay) 
attached as appendices. As a rule, an MTV is long and contains very general 
language because hundreds of firms use them. Managers and works council-
lors in individual enterprises apply broad provisions of an MTV to meet their 
specific needs. The parties to collective bargaining typically renegotiate at 
least some portion of an MTV every three to five years. Besides these three 
types of contracts, many collective bargaining parties have created special 
contracts to address particular concerns in several sectors. The most common 
special contracts provide for employee stock ownership, further education, 
r layoff protection, and supplemental retirement. 
,'< This constellation of complementary collective agreements is complex, 
to be sure, but it does provide for more flexibility than is immediately 
, apparent. After all, contracts differ significantly from sector to sector. 
The nested arrangement of contracts permits bargaining parties to focus 
, on different aspects of industrial relations incrementally as need arises. 
. The contracts are also meant to set minimum standards. TVG article 4 
contains the so-called favorableness principle (Gunstigkeitsprinzip) that 
allows management to improve compensation unilaterally above the rates 
spelled out in a regionwide collective agreement but not to undercut it. 
Firms may pay more if they wish, and many do so in order to remain 
competitive within a tight local labor market, to reduce turnover, or to at-
. tract the best employees. Employers and works councils may also negotiate 
. a "workplace agreement" (Betriebsvereinbamng), which would supplement 
>x" a collective agreement, in order to codify understandings regarding extra 
x' compensation that are specific to a workplace. An agreement with a works 
^ council does not fall under the protection of the TVG because works 
councils are not eligible to be a party to a collective agreement as defined 
by article 2 of the act. Agreements to provide workplace compensation 
- below the contractually specified minima are also permitted, but only if the 
collective bargaining parties both agree. 
